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This study determines how to invest limited resources to increase the resilience of an 
infrastructure system against both non-deliberate and deliberate events. We propose an 
optimization model that seeks the best defensive investment for a weighted combination 
of deliberate and non-deliberate events. We formulate the general problem and conduct 
numerical analysis using a specific infrastructure system as a concrete example. We 
perform parametric analysis on the combined model in order to explore the way in which 
different solutions depend on the distributed weights and yield insight into the best 
investment decisions. 
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Owners and operators of critical infrastructure systems face a challenge when it comes to 
investing limited resources to maintain continuity of function in the presence of 
disruptive events. On the one hand, they need to protect against the most commonly 
occurring disruptions (e.g., failures or weather events). On the other hand, they need to 
protect against worst-case disruptions, as might be caused by an intelligent adversary 
who uses insider knowledge to deliberately interrupt system function. Often these two 
types of potential disruptions point to different parts of the system as “critical,” and in 
that case this tension can lead to a dilemma in terms of what to protect. 
In this study, we consider how to invest limited resources to increase the 
resilience of an infrastructure system against both non-deliberate and deliberate events. 
We represent the function of the infrastructure as a network flow problem and use an 
optimization model that seeks the best defensive investment for a weighted combination 
of deliberate and non-deliberate events. We conduct parametric analysis on the combined 
model in order to explore the way in which different solutions depend on the distributed 
weights and yield insight into the best investment decisions. From our analysis, we 
discover that it is possible to choose the best defense for that specific network by 
mapping the frontier between the worst-case and random disruptions. The results of that 
frontier gives us insight into (1) the minimum number of edges to protect, (2) the 
maximum defense for both worst-case and random disruptions, and (3) a moderate cost-
effective defense for both worst-case and random disruptions  
Our investigation of a small network system provides proof-of-concept that the 
technique we propose can be effective, but there is more work to be done. In particular, 
our solutions are computationally intensive even for small systems, and additional 
research to reduce the required computational effort is needed before the technique can 
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The United States (U.S.) has critical infrastructure systems (e.g., electric power, 
transportation, telecommunications, water) that need to be protected from disruptive 
events that are non-deliberate (e.g., natural disasters, accidents, failures) and deliberate 
(e.g., vandalism, sabotage, terrorism). Recently, these systems have been the targets 
terrorist attacks (September 11, 2001) and natural disasters (Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
and Hurricane Sandy in 2012) which caused billions of dollars in damage. In response to 
these and other disruptive events, the U.S. is spending billions of tax payer dollars 
annually (e.g., $50 billion in 2014) to strengthen infrastructure (The White House 2014). 
Of particular interest is how to allocate these funds in a manner that increases the 
resilience of our critical infrastructure systems.   
In the reliability engineering literature (e.g., Hwang et al. 1981 and Billinton and 
Allan 1992) and the risk literature (e.g., Bedford and Cook 2001), non-deliberate 
disruptions are commonly modeled as random events using probabilities. However, 
deliberate disruptions are more appropriately represented as worst-case events  
using game theory (e.g., Brown et al. 2006). These two perspectives often point to 
different parts of an infrastructure system as “critical.” This leaves policy makers in a 
quandary about how to invest a limited defensive budget to make the infrastructure 
system more resilient.  
The goal of this study is to determine how to invest limited resources to increase 
the resilience of an infrastructure against both non-deliberate and deliberate events.  
This information will provide decision makers with insight into which assets to protect 
and how much emphasis to put toward preparing for natural disasters vice a  
terrorist attack. 
We propose an optimization model that seeks the best defensive investment  
for a weighted combination of deliberate and non-deliberate events. We formulate the 
general problem and conduct numerical analysis using a specific infrastructure system  
as a concrete example. We perform parametric analysis on the weights in the combined 
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model in order to explore the way in which different solutions depend on the distributed 
weights and yield insight into the best investment decisions.  
 3
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Presidential Decision Directive 21 (PPD21), issued in February 2013, establishes 
national policy on critical infrastructure security and resilience (The White House 2013). 
Following the definition established previously in the USA PATRIOT Act (Department 
of Justice (DOJ) 2001), PPD21 defines critical infrastructure to include “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or 
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, 
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters.”   
PPD21 specifically states “It is the policy of the United States to strengthen the 
security and resilience of its critical infrastructure… to take proactive steps to manage 
risk and strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure, 
considering all hazards that could have a debilitating impact on national security, 
economic stability, public health and safety, or any combination thereof. These efforts 
shall seek to reduce vulnerabilities, minimize consequences, identify and disrupt threats, 
and hasten response and recovery efforts related to critical infrastructure.” In its 
definition of “all hazards,” PPD21 refers to “a threat or an incident, natural or manmade 
[that]… includes natural disasters, cyber incidents, industrial accidents, pandemics, acts 
of terrorism, sabotage, and destructive criminal activity targeting critical infrastructure.” 
In response to PPD21, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued an 
updated National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in December 2013. The 2013 
edition of the NIPP “continues to focus on risk management as the foundation of critical 
infrastructure security and resilience” (p. 4).   
The application of risk analysis to critical infrastructure systems follows a long 
history in the application of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) to complex engineering 
systems (see Bedford and Cook 2001 for an introduction, or National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) 2011 for a recent application of PRA to space mission 
planning). Following the attacks of 9/11, much of the work on risk to critical 
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infrastructure has focused on the application of PRA to terrorism risk (e.g., Pate-Cornell 
and Guikema 2002, Garrick et al. 2004, Parnell, et al. 2005, Willis 2007). The 
Department of Homeland Security has promoted the use of probabilistic techniques when 
assessing the risk critical infrastructure systems (DHS 2013).  
A different line of research has focused on the ability of an intelligent adversary 
to deliberately disrupt system function. Specifically, there is now considerable work on 
the use of system interdiction models for understanding homeland security problems and 
the risk to critical infrastructure systems—these models are known as Attacker-Defender 
(AD) and Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD) problems (Brown et al., 2005, Brown et 
al., 2006, Alderson et al., 2014a, b). Applications of this model have been used in a 
variety of systems: fuel (Ileto 2011), cargo (De La Cruz 2011), the electric grid 
(Salmeron et al. 2004, 2009), and military networks (Burton 2013, Long 2013).   
In this thesis, we propose a model to defend our infrastructure against both non-
deliberate hazards and deliberate threats. We use a linear combination of the two 
techniques previously described in order to map the efficient frontier of the tradeoffs 
between the consequences of a worst-case attack and expected consequence over a set of 
random events that will give decision makers the ability to choose the type of protection 
needed for his or her particular network. 
Previous work by Bier (2007), Zhuang and Bier (2007), and Hausken et al. (2009) 
has looked at the challenge of choosing what to protect, particularly when facing “all 
hazards” to include deliberate and non-deliberate events. However, these studies have 
abstracted the consequence of the event to a simple known function. As demonstrated by 
Alderson et al. (2013), in general it is difficult to approximate the consequences of losing 
one or more infrastructure components, or to pick the most vital components in a network 
system. An explicit objective of this research is to connect the operational models of 
infrastructure function and consequence assessment with the need to identify protective 




III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter, we present a sequence of models that we use to perform our 
analysis. Throughout, we follow the concepts and notation in Alderson et al. (2014a). A 
specific implementation of these models follows in Chapter IV. 
A. NORMAL OPERATION 
In this section, we provide an overview of the sequence of models to follow. Our 
starting point is an Operator Model of the form 
 
ˆ(w)
ˆ ˆmin ( , , )
y Y
f w x y , (1) 
where wˆ  denotes the fixed design of the system, xˆ  denotes the operational setting (e.g., 
the status of each component of the system), and Y( wˆ) denotes the set of feasible 
activities available to the system operator, given design wˆ . 
The Operator Model represents the decision making of an entity, called the 
operator, who chooses the activities in the system. The Operator Model is prescriptive; its 
solution *
ˆ(w)
ˆ ˆarg min ( , , )
y Y
y f w x y

  represents the activities in the system that yield the 
minimum operating cost. 
The Operator Model (1) is a mathematical program that can be solved using 
various techniques (see Alderson et al. 2014a for a detailed discussion).   
B. WORST-CASE DISRUPTIONS 
We are interested in understanding how well the system performs in the presence 
of worst-case disruptions and/or most likely disruptions. For a fixed design wˆ ,  we define  
 
ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) max min ( , , )
y Y wx X
P w f w x y ,  (2) 
where X is the set of feasible disruptive events, and *
ˆ(w)
ˆ ˆarg max min ( , , )
y Yx X
x f w x y
   is a 
worst-case disruptive event. Here, P( wˆ) represents the performance of the system in the 
presence of the worst-case disruptive event. We refer to (2) as the Attacker Model; it 
builds on the previous formulation but has additional elements. 
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In general, P( wˆ) can be evaluated three ways: 
1. by exhaustive enumeration of x X ,  
2. by taking the dual of the inner Operator Model to transform the max-min  
of the Attacker Model into a max-max problem (e.g., Brown et al., 2006), 
and 
3. using Bender’s decomposition (e.g., Benders, 1962). 
Given a set of possible designs W , our goal is to find a design w W that yields 
“good” performance in the presence of disruptive events. 
If we are only concerned with defending against worst-case disruptions, then we 




. This is simply a deterministic Defender-
Attacker-Defender (DAD) problem. Let *DW W  denote the set of optimal designs that 
minimize P(w). That is, ** * arg min ( )D
w W
w W w P w

    . 
In principle, solving the Defender Model requires nothing more than enumerating 
every possible combination of defense and attack, then solving the corresponding 
Operator Model for each, and then finding the one that yields the lowest cost. This is the 
first half of our combined model which will determine the effect of the worst case. The 
second half of the model is the probabilistic model that optimizes defense against 
hazards. 
C. PROBABILISTIC DISRUPTION (MOST LIKELY) 
For a fixed design wˆ , define  
 
ˆ(w)
ˆ ˆ( ) mi n ( , , )x y Yw E f w yQ x   , (3) 
where x  is a random variable having a specified distribution, and xE  denotes the 
expectation relative to x . Here, Q( wˆ) represents the average performance of the system 
in the presence of a random disruptive event. 
In general, Q( wˆ) can be evaluated two ways: 
1. via Monte Carlo sampling on x , and  
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2. using exhaustive enumeration if x  is discrete to compute an exact 
expectation. 
 
If we are only concerned with defending against random disruptive events, then 




. This is simply a stochastic optimization 
problem. Let *sW W  denote the set of optimal designs that minimize Q(w). That is, 
** * argmin ( )s
w W
w W w Q w

    . 
D. DEFENDING AGAINST WORST-CASE AND MOST LIKELY 
In practice, we are concerned with both random disruptive events and worst-case 
disruptive events. To determine a good design, we must take into considerations the 
following two possibilities. 
1. Observe that if * *D SW W   , then we have an optimal solution to both 
problems and there is no issue. We simply choose * ** ( )D Sw W W   . 
2.  However, in general we expect * *D SW W   . More strongly, our 
experience is often that the worst-case disruptive event is very different 
from the average case disruptive event. This creates a dilemma in terms of 
where to invest defensive resources to make the system more resilient. 
We propose to study the combined problem as  
 * ( min[ ( ) (1 ) ( )]
w W
Z P w Q w

        where 0  .   (4) 
Note that when   , Eq.(4) corresponds to the stochastic average-case. In 
contrast, when 1  , Eq.(4) corresponds to the deterministic worst-case. 
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IV. CASE STUDY 
In this thesis, we use a small numerical example to illustrate our technique. 
Following Alderson et al. (2014b), Figure 1 displays a notional (fuel distribution) 
infrastructure system made of nodes and links. The system is a single commodity 
transshipment model, designed to move fuel from supply locations to demand locations. 
 
Figure 1.  Notional fuel distribution network (from Alderson et al. 2014b). 
 
In Figure 1, the white circles represent locations with demand = 1 and the black 
circles represent locations with supply = 10. All links are bidirectional and have per unit 
flow usage cost = 1. Each link has capacity = 15 and the penalty for unsatisfied demand 
per node = 10. Usage penalty for an interdicted arc = 20 per unit of flow (e.g., hiring a 
truck to drive the unit of flow to bypass the link). The objective is to minimize the sum of 
the flow cost for fuel deliveries and any penalties from unsatisfied demands. 
As shown in Figure 1, Nodes 3, 4, and 16 have two (parallel, redundant) 
connections to the rest of the network. This network has been built to be N-1 reliable, 
meaning that the loss of any single link does not disconnect any node. 
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A. OPERATOR MODEL 
We formulate the Operator Model for this system as follows. 
Indices and Sets 
n ∈ N   nodes (alias i,j) 
[i,j] ∈ E  undirected edge between nodes i and j, i<j 
(i,j) ∈ A  directed arc from node i to node j 
   [i,j] ∈ E ⟺ (i<j) ∧ ((i,j)  ∈ A ∧ (j,i) ∈ A)) 
d∈ D   defenses, D={0,1}: 0 represents undefended, 1 represents 
defended (and invulnerable)  
Data [units] 
cij   per unit cost of traversing arc (i,j) ∈ A [dollars/barrel]  
uij   upper bound on total (undirected) flow on edge [i,j] ∈ E  
   [barrels] 

ijx    1 if edge [i,j] ∈ E damaged, 0 otherwise [binary] 
d
ijq     per unit penalty cost of traversing arc (i,j) ∈ A if damaged  
   [dollars/barrel] 
bn   fuel supply at node n ∈ N [barrels] 
   (-demand for bn <0 ) 
vn   per unit penalty cost for demand shortfall n ∈ N  
   [dollars/barrel] 
ˆ dijw  1 if defense option d is implemented on edge [i,j] ∈ E,  
0 otherwise [binary] 
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Decision Variables [units] 
d
ijY     flow on arc (i,j) ∈ A for defense d [barrels] 
Sn   fuel shortfall at node n ∈ N [barrels] 
 
Formulation:   
   
 
[ , ]




ˆ [ , ] , (D2)










nj in n n n
j n j A i i n
d d d
ij ij ji ji ij ji n nY S d D n N
d D d D A
d d d d
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x Y c q
u w i j A d D
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   
   














The objective function (D0) combines the total flow cost and the total penalty 
cost. Constraints (D1) enforce balance of flow at each node. Stipulations (D2) and (D3) 
ensure bounds on decision variables. This formulation implements cost-based 
interdiction—that is, damage to an arc makes it extremely expensive but not infeasible—
which makes the problem easier to solve computationally. In the above example, we have 
b8=b10=10 and bn=-1 otherwise. In addition, we set cij=1, 1 0, ( , )ijq i j A    
100, ( , )iju i j A   , 0 10, ( , )ijq i j A   , uij=15 for all [i,j] ∈ E, and vn =10 for all n∈ N. 
There are no arcs defended in the base case; therefore, 1ˆ ijw =0 and
0ˆ ijw =1 for all [i,j] ∈ E. 
Solving this problem, we obtain a minimum-cost solution consisting of flows that 
meet all the demands (see Figure 2), with the flows labeled in blue. Our findings are 
consistent to the base solution findings in Alderson et al. (2014b). We are concerned with 
the ability of the system to perform in the presence of either random (probabilistic) or 
deliberate (worst-case) disruptive events. 
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Figure 2.  Operator Model base solution 
B. ATTACKER MODEL 
For this notional fuel system, we model the attacker’s problem as follows. 
 
Additional Data[units] 
rij   “cost” to break edge [i,j] ∈	 E [cardinality] 
attack_budget  budget constraint on the number of simultaneous attacks 
    [cardinality] 
 
 
Additional Decision Variables [units] 




   
[, , ]
[ , ]
min ) ( ) (AD0)
s.t . (D1), (D





ij ij ji ji ij ji n nY
d






P w c q X
r X attack budget
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     

   
 
The objective function (AD0) is the same as that for the Operator Model (D0), 
except that parameters x̂ij have been replaced by decision variables Xij. Constraint (AD1) 
limits the number of simultaneous attacks, and the cost to attack each arc can be different. 
Stimpulations (AD2) require that attacks are binary. We note that qij = 0 implies that arc 
(i,j) is effectively invulnerable, because attacking it does not increase the flow cost for the 
operator.  
In the above example, we model parallel arcs as costing twice as much to attack. 
That is, we have r2,3 =  r4,8 = r12,16 = 2 and all other rij = 1. 
The solution for the Attacker Model depends on the attacker budget (the number 
of attacks that the attacker can afford). The attacker seeks to maximize the cost to the 
operator. In Figure 3, an attack on edge [10,13] represents the worst case attack to the 
operator when the attacker can afford to target only a single edge. The operator reroutes 
his flow as shown in blue and the overall operator cost increases from 25 to 33. An 
attacker having the ability to target a large number of edges could render our network 
practically useless as shown in Figure 4. Here, the attacker has the budget to target five 
edges and focuses on the arcs around the supply nodes to cripple flow to the entire 
network with exception to node 4. The attacker picks the best place to attack depending 
on how many attacks allotted by the attacking budget. These results are also consistent 




Figure 3.  Operator Model solution with 1 attack 
 
Figure 4.  Operator Model solution with 5 attacks 
C. DEFENDING AGAINST A WORST-CASE ATTACK 
In this thesis, we restrict defensive actions to the “hardening” of edges, such that 
targeting an edge does not increase its usage cost. We formulate the following model. 
Additional Data[units] 
defense_budget budget constraint on the number of defenses [cardinality] 
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Additional Decision Variables [units] 
d
ijW  1 if defense option d is implemented on edge [i,j] ∈ E,  
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 
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The objective (DAD0) includes the cost of flow over existing (and possibly 
damaged or protected) edges and penalties for unmet demand. Contraints (DAD1) 
ensures that flow on edge [i,j] does not exceed flow capacity uij. The constraint (DAD2) 
requires that the cost of all defenses fall within the existing defense budget using the 
binary variable dijW . Constraints (DAD3) ensure that flow on each edge [i,j] is on either 
the protected or unprotected edge and not both. Here, the pair 1ijW =1 and 
0
ijW =0 denotes a 
defended edge and vice versa for undefended. Stipulations (DAD4) require binary 
defense decisions. 
In order to be consistent with Alderson et al. (2014b) we will give examples of 
defense with an attacker budget of three attacks as shown in Figure 5. For the purposes of 





Figure 5.  A. AD Model: worst-case attack involving three edges. In the absence 
of any defenses, edges [2,7], [10,13], and [11,15] are targeted. B. DAD 
Model: the corresponding worst-case attack with one edge protected. 
Edge [10,13] is defended, and edges [6,10], [7,8], and [9,13] are 
targeted.     
The defender model protects edge [10, 13], note that it is the same arc the attacker 
chose as the one arc attack in Figure 3. The attacker picks another set of arcs to attack in 
order to maximize cost for the operator that does not include the defended arc. With edge 
[10,13] defended and in the presence of three targeted edges, the operator is able to 
satisfy demand at seven nodes, instead of only six with no arcs defended.  
The defender can limit the attacker by strengthening more arcs at shown in Figure 
6. However, we cannot defend all arcs because of budget constraints. Therefore, 
decisions about what arcs to protect must be made within those constraints to minimize 
cost to the operator.  
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Figure 6.  Worst-case disruption with 3 edges targeted and 5 edges protected. 
D. EXPECTATION MODEL 
We use the symbol x  to represent a random event in place of xˆ , which denotes a 
set of edges that have been damaged. We calculate the expected cost due to random 
disruptions, and will not focus on a single, worst-case event. For example, 
 2ix x   represents the set of all events with two or fewer links broken. For any 







}. For simplicity, we assume the probability that an edge will go down is 
independent between edges, giving it a binomial distribution with x  becoming a random 
variable. We can think of   as a list of the enumerated (all) possible attacks with 




    set of (enumerated) outcomes 
 
Additional data [units] 
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x   {0,1}E  set of binary vectors, one element for each edge, where 1ijx 
 if edge  ,i j E is damaged, and =0 if the edge remains intact, in 
 outcome   . 
 
Formulation 
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Whereas the AD model yields both the worst-case attack and associated best-
response in the objective value, the result of the ED model is solely the objective value.  
Defending against the average case disruption means we must take into account 
the arcs most likely to fail and either strengthen or build around those arcs in each x . 
E. DEFENDING AGAINST THE EXPECTED CASE 
Just like in the DAD model, we are defending edges in order to minimize the 
system cost in the presence of disruption by carefully choosing which edges to protect. 
The possible defenses will be the same as in the DAD model, just like in Figure 7. 
However, the result will be the objective value comprised of the products from this 





Figure 7.  Example Defense in which edges [2,7], [7,8], [9,13], [10,11], and 
[10,13] are defended. 
Formulation 
In order to determine the best defense for the expected value problem, we use 
Benders decomposition (Benders, 1962), an iterative algorithm in which we use the index 
k to denote an iteration, and K to denote the current iteration of the algorithm. The 
subproblem for any fixed defense wˆ  and any specific outcome    is just  ˆ ,F w  , 
and can be solved as a linear program with associated duals  , dn ij     as given in (E1) 
and (E2). Each of these dual solutions provides a linear lower bound on the objective 
function value of  ,F   as a function of the defense: 
  
[ , ]
, d dn n ij ij ij
n N i j E d D
F b u W   
  
    . 
The weighted sum of these linear functions is thus a lower bound on the expected 
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to be the weighted combinations of the optimal dual solutions to each of the subproblems 
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 ˆ ,kF w   solved in iteration k, yielding a single cut for the set of constraints (SM1) in 
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The objective (SM0) represents the expected cost of operating in the face of 
random events. We minimize this objective through each iteration k as shown in (SM1). 
Each edge [i,j] has two possibilities, denoted with d, and only one can be used at a time 
shown in constraint (SM2). The constraint (SM3) ensures that the defenses used are 
limited to defense_budget. We describe the procedure for solving this problem in the 
context of the combined model, which now follows.  
F. COMBINED MODEL 
If we define stochwt  to be the weight given to the stochastic (i.e., expected-value) 
objective, where stoch0 1wt  , and det stoch1wt wt  to be the remaining weight placed on 
the deterministic (i.e., worst-case) objective, then we can formulate the following 
combined master problem: 
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Here the defense decisions, W, are made before any realization of an attack or a random 
failure, and the evaluation of the defense chosen at iteration k is a convex combination of 
the evaluation of each of the two separate subproblems. 
 At each iteration K of Benders decomposition, our algorithm solves each of the 
two subproblems (stochastic and deterministic) to optimality for a fixed defense, ˆ Kw .  
The constraints from the stochastic master problem transfer directly to this combined 
master problem. The deterministic subproblem yields a single worst-case attack, ˆKx , and 
this provides a lower bound on the cost of the optimal response for that particular attack, 
although only in terms of the flow variables in response to that attack, and this 
contributes a new cut to the set of constraints (CM2) in the master problem. We therefore 
must also create a block of nonnegative variables, KY , to model that response, and two 
additional blocks of constraints to ensure they (a) conform to balance of flow (CM3), and 
thus act like admissible flows in our network, and (b) correspond appropriately to any 
defense, W  (CM4). The algorithm then solves the master problem for iteration K, and 
generates a new defense, 1ˆ kw  . After the subproblems have been solved, we have an 
accurate evaluation of the combined cost of the current defense plan, ˆ Kw . If this cost is 
lower than any seen so far, we record ˆ Kw  as a new incumbent solution and take its cost 
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as the new upper bound. Each solve of the master problem provides a lower bound on the 
optimal solution, and these values are monotonically nondecreasing. If, at any point, the 
relative difference between the best upper bound derived from the subproblems and the 
best lower bound from the master problem is less than a predetermined optimality gap, , 
the algorithm terminates and reports the current incumbent as an -optimal solution. This 
combined model uses the duals from the stochastic model and combines them with the 











V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we explore the differences between the “worst-case” and “most 
likely” disruptions for the notional fuel distribution network in Figure 1. We use the 
combined model to perform our analysis, where in equation (CM0) we have convex 
weights wtdet = α and wtstoch = 1 – α.   
A. ANALYSIS OF FIVE SCENARIOS 
We ran the combined model for five scenarios, each described in the subsections 
below. 
1. Two Attacks and One Defense 
Figure 8 displays the results of the combined model for our notional fuel system 
in the case of two attacks and one defense. For different values of α, we solve the 
combined model to within an optimality tolerance of 0.001. On a computer with a  
dual-core 1.2 GHz processor, the solution time for all scenarios involving two  
attacks was approximately 2 hours for all eleven cases (α=0.0 through α=1.0). For each 
value of α, Figure 8 shows the value for stochZ   and detZ  along with their combination 
weighted by α . 
When defending solely against the worst-case attack (α=1), the best defense is 
[2,7] and the worst two-link attack is [7,8] and [8,12]. When defending solely against 
random events (α=0), the best defense is also [2,7]. Note that the value detZ  is 
significantly higher than stochZ , meaning that the worst-case disruption is significantly 
worse than the average case. Because the worst-case solution does not vary with α, the 
values for stochZ and detZ  are insensitive to changes in α. As a result, the combined 
objective value is not meaningful on its own, rather it represents simply the weighted 
combination of these two constant values. 
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Figure 8.  The objective values for two attacks and one defense versus the weight 
for given weight α. 
2. Two Attacks and Two Defenses 
Just as in the previous case, the worst-case solution does not vary with α, the 
values for stochZ and detZ  are insensitive to changes in α. When defending solely against 
the worst-case attack (α=1), the best defense is [2,7] and [7,8]; while, the worst two-link 
attack is [1,2] and [9,13]. When defending solely against random events (α=0), the best 
defense is also [2,7] and [7,8].  
Table 1 summarizes the results from the scenarios involving no more than two 
broken links. 
Table 1.   Optimal links to defend for different defensive budgets for cases 
when there are no more than two broken links. For this small 
network, we observe that the single best link to protect is [2,7], and 
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3. Three Attacks and One Defense 
The results of the combined model for our notional fuel system in the case of 
three attacks and one defense has a shape similar to the two-attack case. For this scenario, 
we solve the combined model for different values of α to within an optimality tolerance 
of 0.1. On a computer with a dual-core 1.2 GHz processor, the solution time for was 
approximately 6 hours for all eleven cases (α=0.0 through α=1.0). Table 2 displays the 
results of this computation. 
Table 2.   Combined model results for three attacks and one defense 
α edge to defend worst attack objective_(CM0) obj_Zdet obj_Zstoch 
0.0 (Stoch) [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 29.47955282 80 29.47955282 
0.1 [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 34.53159754 80 29.47955282 
0.2 [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 39.58364226 80 29.47955282 
0.3 [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 44.63568697 80 29.47955282 
0.4 [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 49.68773169 80 29.47955282 
0.5 [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 54.73977641 80 29.47955282 
0.6 [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 59.79182113 80 29.47955282 
0.7 [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 64.84386585 80 29.47955282 
0.8 [2,7] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 69.89591056 80 29.47955282 
0.9 [13,10] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 75.02040504 80 30.2040504 
1.0 (Det) [13,10] [9,13][6,10][7,8] 80 80 30.2040504 
 
When defending solely against the worst-case attack (α=1), the best defense is 
[13,10] and the worst three-link attack is [7,8], [9,13] and [6,10] as shown in Table 2. 
While defending solely against random events (α=0), the best defense is [2,7]. There is a 
difference in the solution for the worst-case and the solution for random events; however, 
the solution doesn’t change until 0.9   toward the worst-case. The difference in cost to 
the operator between protecting edge [2,7] and [13,10] is one. Similar to the two attack 
scenarios, the value detZ  is significantly higher than stochZ . There is more value in 
protecting [2,7] for the stochastic case than [13,10], but the values for stochZ are similar for 
the two cases. Overall, the values for stochZ and detZ  are insensitive to changes in α, but 
 26
are far from each other. Again, the combined objective value represents simply the 
weighted combination of these two constant values. 
4. Three Attacks and Two Defenses 
We similarly solve for the results of the combined model for our notional fuel 
system in the case of three attacks and two defenses. On a computer with a dual-core 1.2 
GHz processor, the solution time for was approximately 10 hours for all eleven cases 
(α=0.0 through α=1.0). Table 3 displays the results of this computation. 
Table 3.   Combined model results for three attacks and two defenses 
α edge to defend worst attack objective_(CM0) obj_Zdet  obj_Zstoch 
0.0 (Stoch) [2,7][7,8] [1,2][13,10][11,15] 28.03713818 72 28.03713818 
0.1 [2,7][7,8] [1,2][13,10][11,15] 32.43342436 72 28.03713818 
0.2 [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 36.47357923 67 28.84197404 
0.3 [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 40.28938182 67 28.84197404 
0.4 [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 44.10518442 67 28.84197404 
0.5 [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 47.92098702 67 28.84197404 
0.6 [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 51.73678961 67 28.84197404 
0.7 [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 55.55259221 67 28.84197404 
0.8 [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 59.36839481 67 28.84197404 
0.9 [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 63.1841974 67 28.84197404 
1.0 (Det) [13,10][7,8] [13,14][8,12][10,11] 67 67 28.84197404 
 
The difference between defending solely against random events (α=0) and the 
worst-case attack (α=1) is the defending of edge [2,7] vice [13,10]. Although [13,10] and 
[2,7] yield the two highest operating costs for attacking a  single edge, it is more 
important to protect only one of them along with [7,8] due the construction of the 
network as shown in Figure 1. Unlike the previous defense for three attacks, the solution 
turns to the worst-case when 0.2  , meaning, when coupled with the defense of [7,8] it 
is more beneficial for both models to protect [13,10] vice [2,7].  
5. Three Attacks and Three Defenses 
We similarly solve for the results of the combined model for our notional fuel 
system in the case of three attacks and three defenses. On a computer with a dual-core 1.2 
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GHz processor, the solution time for was approximately 13 hours for all eleven cases 
(α=0.0 through α=1.0). Table 4 displays the results of this computation. 
Table 4.   Combined model results for three attacks and three defenses 
α edge to defend worst attack objective_(CM0) obj_Zdet obj_Zstoch 
0.0 (Stoch) [2,7][7,8][9,13] [1,2][13,10][11,15] 27.45686501 72 27.45686501
0.1 [2,7][7,8][13,10] [8,12][13,14][10,11] 31.26976353 67 27.29973726
0.2 [2,7][7,8][13,10] [8,12][13,14][10,11] 35.23978981 67 27.29973726
0.3 [13,10][7,8][8,12] [2,7][9,13][10,11] 39.12518556 64 28.4645508
0.4 [13,10][7,8][8,12] [2,7][9,13][10,11] 42.67873048 64 28.4645508
0.5 [13,10][7,8][8,12] [2,7][9,13][10,11] 46.2322754 64 28.4645508
0.6 [13,10][7,8][8,12] [2,7][9,13][10,11] 49.78582032 64 28.4645508
0.7 [13,10][7,8][8,12] [2,7][9,13][10,11] 53.33936524 64 28.4645508
0.8 [13,10][7,8][8,12] [2,7][9,13][10,11] 56.89291016 64 28.4645508
0.9 [13,10][7,8][8,12] [2,7][9,13][10,11] 60.44645508 64 28.4645508
1.0 (Det) [13,10][7,8][10,11] [2,7][9,13][8,12] 64 64 28.68990798
  
The three attack and three defense solution for the combined model isn’t as 
intuitive as the previous two scenarios. When 0.3 0.9   , the optimal solution defends 
edges [8,12], [13,10], and [7,8]. Showing that moderate protection against both random 
and worst-case disruptions is separate from the solutions for either event as shown in 
Table 2.  
Figure 9 shows that as the values for the separate models change, the objective 
function still maintains the linear characteristic as expected; however the operator costs 
for detZ goes down for each change in defense while stochZ  goes up slightly for the 
increase in α. The worst case and expectation models both chose the same edges to 
defend for the two attack scenario as shown in the Table 1. This result makes it easy for a 
decision maker to choose which items to defend for the best possible protection. The 
problem for decision makers is shown in the case of three attacks.  
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Figure 9.  The objective values for three attacks and three defenses versus the 
weight for given weight α. 
B. DISCUSSION 
In the case of random disruptions, with a limited number of defenses, we might 
not be able to protect our system against the (potentially enormous) set of disruptions 
near the “center” of the distribution. However, if there are only a few disruptions that 
cause significant damage (i.e., well above the mean) then we can apply our limited 
resources to reduce their impact and therefore have a noticeable effect on the expected 
cost over the entire distribution of random disruptions. 
Figure 10 displays the overall value of having one, two, or three defenses, when 
protecting against three attacks. There are diminishing returns for the third defense used. 























Figure 10.  Multiple defense options  against the three attacks scenario: Objective 
value for given defense with weight α in equation (CM0), where wtdet 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we have presented a model for defensive investment that combines 
the threat of a worst-case disruption with the risk of a random disruption. Our 
combination model has the potential to help decision makers come up with a good 
defense that fits their particular network. From our analysis we discover that it is possible 
to choose the best defense for that given network by mapping the frontier between the 
worst-case and random disruptions.  
Our investigation of a small network system provides proof-of-concept that the 
technique we propose can be effective, but there is more work to be done. We discovered 
that the stochastic model runs longer than the combined model. Interestingly, this 
suggests that knowing how to defend against the worst-case potentially provides insight 
into how to defend against random events. However, even for the small example here, the 
program takes a long period of time to solve the combined model for three attacks and 
two or more defenses. Therefore, additional research to reduce the required 
computational effort is needed before the technique can be used at large scale.  
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APPENDIX 
Our computational models and solution were obtained with the Python 
programming language and the Cooper-Pyomo optimization module using CPLEX as the 
solver. The program is solved using five modules. The combo_main.py module 
contains the outer loop for multiple runs of the model and is the driver that branches into 
the other modules. We have a separate module, phat_code.py, to create the 
distribution for the probability of damaging one or more arcs. The network is built using 
the networkx module, in netx_graph.py, by building the list of edges and nodes. The 
file combo_model.py creates the pyomo models for the master and sub problems used 
to create cuts and implement benders. The file pyomo_model.py creates and solves 






import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
#open file 
file= open('ComboResults.txt','w') 
file.write('Weight (Worst), Arcs Defended, Objective value, Worst attack,Worst 
value,Random value\n') 
test = [0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9,1] 
for weight in test:  
    if __name__ == '__main__': 
        #establish nodes, edges, start_nodes, and double_edges 
        #This will eventually occur in a subroutine that parses input files 
        nodes = ['1','2','3','4','5','6','7','9','11','12','13','14','15','16'] 




        start_nodes = ('10','8') 
        double_edges =[('2','3'),('8','4'),('12','16')] 
        #build graph 
        Grph, vuln, double_nodes = netx_graph.newmodel(nodes, start_nodes, 
edges, double_edges) 
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        #establish single-edge probabilities and initialize xhat 
        phat, xhat = phat_code.phat_edges(Grph, vuln) 
        defenses = ['0', '1'] 
        w_hat = {} 
        for (i,j) in vuln: 
            w_hat[i,j,'0'] = 1 
            w_hat[i,j,'1'] = 0 
     
        #Create dictionaries for node supplies and vulnerable edge capacities 
        supply = {} 
        for item in Grph.nodes(): 
            if item in start_nodes: 
                supply[item] = 10 
            elif item in double_nodes: 
                supply[item] = 0 
            else: 
                supply[item] = -1 
        capacity = {} 
        for (i,j) in vuln: 
            capacity[i,j] = 10 
        #generate probability map for all events with two or fewer failures 
        P = phat_code.create_Prob(Grph,vuln,phat,3) 
        print 'Number of events: ' + str(len(P)) 
        max_iterations = 50 
        nodepi = {}  #dictionary of node duals, by iteration 
        edgemu = {}  #dictionary of arc capacity duals, by iteration 
        xhats = {}   #dictionary of worst-case attacks, by iteration 
     
        LB=0               # can set this based on first MP solve... 
        UB=10000           # should come up with a better way of handling this 
        master_tol = 0.10  # relative gap tolerance for terminating benders 
        det_wt = weight 
        stoch_wt = 1-weight 
        for iteration in range(max_iterations):  
            expected_cost = 0 
            cumul_p = 0 
            for (scen_num,x_tilde) in enumerate(P.keys()): 
                xhat = phat_code.generate_xhat_from_x_tilde(vuln,x_tilde,xhat) 
 35
                model, instance = 
pyo_model.build_model(Grph,xhat,w_hat,vuln,defenses,supply,capacity) 
                results = pyo_model.solve_model(instance) 
                instance.load(results) 
                objective_value = instance.FlowCost() 
                if scen_num == 0: 
                    worst_scen = x_tilde 
                    worst_obj = objective_value 
                    for node in Grph.nodes(): 
                        dualval = 
instance.dual.getValue(instance.FlowBalance[node]) 
                        if abs(dualval) > 1e-08: 
                            nodepi[node,iteration] = P[x_tilde]*dualval 
                        else: 
                            nodepi[node,iteration] = 0.0 
                    for (i,j) in vuln: 
                        for defense in defenses: 
                            dualval= 
instance.dual.getValue(instance.EdgeCapacity[i,j,defense]) 
                            if abs(dualval) > 1e-08: 
                                edgemu[i,j,defense,iteration]= 
P[x_tilde]*dualval 
                            else: 
                                edgemu[i,j,defense,iteration] = 0.0 
                else: 
                    if worst_obj < objective_value: 
                        worst_obj = objective_value 
                        worst_scen = x_tilde 
                    for node in Grph.nodes(): 
                        dualval= 
instance.dual.getValue(instance.FlowBalance[node]) 
                        if abs(dualval) > 1e-08: 
                            nodepi[node,iteration] += P[x_tilde]*dualval 
                    for (i,j) in vuln: 
                        for defense in defenses: 
                            dualval= 
instance.dual.getValue(instance.EdgeCapacity[i,j,defense]) 
                        if abs(dualval) > 1e-08: 
                            edgemu[i,j,defense,iteration] += P[x_tilde]*dualval 
             
                expected_cost += P[x_tilde] * objective_value 
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                cumul_p += P[x_tilde] 
                #provide intermittent updates 
                #if scen_num % 25 == 0: 
                #  print str(scen_num) + ': ' + str(objective_value) + '  
approx. expected cost: ' + str(expected_cost/cumul_p) 
                #if len(x_tilde)==0: 
                #  print '***' + str(scen_num) + ': ' + str(objective_value) + 
'  approx. expected cost: ' + str(expected_cost/cumul_p) 
            print 'Subproblem Iteration:' + str(iteration)  
            print '   Expected Cost   = ' + str(expected_cost) 
            print '   Worst-Case Cost = ' + str(worst_obj) 
            for (i,j) in worst_scen: 
                print '      Attack: (' + str(i) + ', ' + str(j) + ')' 
            print '   Weighted Cost   = ' + str(stoch_wt*expected_cost + 
det_wt*worst_obj) 
            #print edgemu 
            #print nodepi 
            if iteration==0: 
                incumbent = w_hat 
                UB = stoch_wt*expected_cost + det_wt*worst_obj 
                inc_iteration = 0 
                print '***new incumbent: (UB) ' + str(UB) 
                x_star=worst_scen 
                x_star_obj= worst_obj 
                x_tilde_obj=expected_cost 
            else: 
                if UB > stoch_wt*expected_cost + det_wt*worst_obj: 
                    UB = stoch_wt*expected_cost + det_wt*worst_obj 
                    incumbent=w_hat 
                    inc_iteration = iteration 
                    print '***new incumbent: (UB) ' + str(UB) 
                    x_star=worst_scen 
                    x_star_obj= worst_obj 
                    x_tilde_obj=expected_cost 
            if UB-LB<master_tol*LB: 
                break 
            for (i,j) in vuln: 
                if (i,j) in worst_scen: 
                    xhats[i,j,iteration] = 1 
                else: 
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                    xhats[i,j,iteration] = 0 
     
            model, instance = combo_model.BuildComboMaster(Grph, vuln, 
defenses, 3, iteration+1, det_wt, stoch_wt, xhats, nodepi, edgemu, supply, 
capacity) 
            results = combo_model.SolveModel(instance) 
            instance.load(results) 
            print 'Master Iteration: ' + str(iteration) 
            w_hat = {} 
            for (i,j) in vuln: 
                for d in defenses: 
                    if instance.W[i,j,d].value > 1e-08: 
                        w_hat[i,j,d] = 1 
                        if d=='1': 
                            print 'Defend (' + str(i) + ',' + str(j) + ')  W=' 
+ str(w_hat[i,j,d]) 
                    else: 
                        w_hat[i,j,d] = 0 
            if LB < instance.MasterObjective(): 
                LB = instance.MasterObjective() 
            print 'Master objective: (LB) ' + str(instance.MasterObjective()) 
            if UB-LB<master_tol*LB: 
                break 
        print 
        if UB-LB<master_tol*LB: 
            print 'Optimality Gap Reached at iteration=' +str(iteration)  
        else: 
            print 'Iteration limit reached at iteration=' +str(iteration)  
        print 'Incumbent Defense found at iteration=' +str(inc_iteration)  
        for (i,j) in vuln: 
            if incumbent[i,j,'1'] > 1e-08: 
                print '  Defend (' + str(i) + ',' + str(j) + ')' 
                file.write('('+str(i) + ',' + str(j) + ')' ) 
        print 'Expected Cost:  ' + str(UB) 
        print 'Lower Bound:    ' + str(LB) 
        if LB>0: 




#End combo_main.py  
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#Begin netx_graph.py 
#Build the graph using networkx 
import networkx as nx 
 
def twolines(a,b,grph, vulnerable_edges, double_nodes): 
    #create the equivalent of two parallel edges between nodes a and b by 
adding  
    #four artificial nodes and twelve directed arcs 
    suffix_1 = "_" + a + "_" + b 
    suffix_2 = "_" + b + "_" + a 
    grph.add_node(a + suffix_1, node_size = 99,node_color='y') 
    grph.add_node(b + suffix_1, color='y') 
    grph.add_node(a + suffix_2, color='y') 
    grph.add_node(b + suffix_2, color='y') 
    grph.add_edge(a, a + suffix_1, cost =0) 
    grph.add_edge(a, a + suffix_2, cost =0) 
    grph.add_edge(a + suffix_1, a, cost =0) 
    grph.add_edge(a + suffix_2, a, cost =0) 
    grph.add_edge(b, b + suffix_1, cost=0) 
    grph.add_edge(b, b + suffix_2, cost=0) 
    grph.add_edge(b + suffix_1, b, cost=0) 
    grph.add_edge(b + suffix_2, b, cost=0) 
    grph.add_edge(a + suffix_1, b + suffix_1, cost = 1) 
    grph.add_edge(a + suffix_2, b + suffix_2, cost = 1) 
    grph.add_edge(b + suffix_1, a+suffix_1, cost = 1) 
    grph.add_edge(b + suffix_2, a+suffix_2, cost = 1) 
    vulnerable_edges.append( (a+suffix_1,b+suffix_1) ) 
    vulnerable_edges.append( (a+suffix_2,b+suffix_2) ) 
    double_nodes.append(a+suffix_1) 
    double_nodes.append(a+suffix_2) 
    double_nodes.append(b+suffix_1) 
    double_nodes.append(b+suffix_2) 
    return 
     
def doubs(a, b, grph, vulnerable_edges): 
    #create two directed arcs to represent an undirected edge between nodes a 
and b 
    grph.add_edge(a, b, cost=1) 
    grph.add_edge(b, a, cost=1) 
    vulnerable_edges.append( (a,b) )     
    return 
     
#Create the model 
def newmodel(nodes, start_nodes, edges, double_edges): 
    vulnerable_edges = [] 
    double_nodes = [] 
    g = nx.DiGraph() 
    #node list 
    for i in nodes: 
        if i in start_nodes: 
            g.add_node(i, node_color ='b') 
        else: 
            g.add_node(i, node_color='r') 
   
    #edge list 
    for i,j in edges: 
        doubs(i,j,g,vulnerable_edges) 
    for i,j in double_edges: 
        twolines(i,j,g,vulnerable_edges, double_nodes) 
    return g, vulnerable_edges, double_nodes 
#End netx_graph.py  
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#Begin phat_code.py 
#Import random functions 
import random 
from itertools import combinations 
import math 
 
#Take a list of vulnerable edges and assign probabilities to them 
def phat_edges(graph,vulnerable_edges): 
    random.seed(0) 
    phat = {} 
    xhat = {} 
    #Initialize probablity of arcs with random and initialize xhat =0 
    #for tups in graph.edges(): 
    for tups in vulnerable_edges: 
        temp = random.random() 
        phat[tups]= temp*.3 + .01 
        xhat [tups]= 0 
    return phat, xhat 
 
def create_Prob(graph,vulnerable_edges,phat,max_losses=None): 
    """Build dictionary of events and their associated probabilities. 
    Assumes elements (vulnerable_edges) fail independently with 
    probabilities specified by the dictionary phat. If 
    max_losses is specified, computes conditional probabilities 
    for events whose cardinality does not exceed it.""" 
    Prob={} 
    if max_losses == None or max_losses > len(vulnerable_edges): 
        max_losses = len(vulnerable_edges) 
    for i in range(max_losses+1): 
        for x_tilde in combinations(vulnerable_edges,i): 
            p=1 
            for e in vulnerable_edges: 
                if e in x_tilde: 
                    p *= phat[e] 
                else: 
                    p *= 1-phat[e] 
            Prob[x_tilde]=p 
    #normalize probabilities 
    totprob = math.fsum(Prob.values()) 
    for x_tilde in Prob: 
        Prob[x_tilde] /= totprob 
    return Prob 
 
 
def generate_xhat(vulnerable_edges,phat, xhat): 
    for edges in vulnerable_edges: 
        temp = random.random() 
        if temp <= phat[edges]: 
            xhat[edges]=1 
        else: 
            xhat[edges]=0 
    return xhat 
 
def generate_xhat_from_x_tilde(vulnerable_edges,x_tilde,xhat): 
    for edge in vulnerable_edges: 
        if edge in x_tilde: 
            xhat[edge]=1 
        else: 
            xhat[edge]=0 
    return xhat 
#End phat_code.py  
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#Begin combo_model.py 
from __future__ import division 
import sys 
 
#Import coopr and Solver 
from coopr.pyomo import * 




    nodeterm = sum(model.b[i]*model.pi[i,iter_num] for i in model.Nodes)  
    arcterm = sum(model.u[i,j]*model.mu[i,j,d,iter_num]*model.W[i,j,d] for 
(i,j,d) in model.Vuln*model.Defenses) 
    return model.Z_Stoch >= nodeterm + arcterm 
     
def MasterDetCut(model,iter_num): 
    edge_sum = ( 
sum((model.Y[i,j,'0',iter_num]*(model.c[i,j]+(model.xhat[i,j,iter_num]*model.q[
i,j])))for (i,j) in model.Vuln)  
                
+sum((model.Y[j,i,'0',iter_num]*(model.c[j,i]+(model.xhat[i,j,iter_num]*model.q
[j,i])))for (i,j) in model.Vuln)  
                +sum((model.Y[i,j,'1',iter_num]*(model.c[i,j])) for (i,j) in 
model.Arcs) 
                 ) 
    node_sum = sum(model.v[j]*model.S[j, iter_num] for j in model.Nodes) 
    return  model.Z_Det >= edge_sum + node_sum 
 
def MasterDetFlowBalance(model,node,iter_num): 
    amountIn = sum (model.Y[i,j,defense,iter_num] for (i,j,defense) in 
model.Arcs*model.Defenses if j==node) 
    amountOut = sum (model.Y[i,j,defense,iter_num] for (i,j,defense) in 
model.Arcs*model.Defenses if i==node) 
    supply = model.b[node] 
    return amountOut - amountIn - model.S[node,iter_num] <= supply  
 
def MasterDetEdgeCapacity(model,i,j,defense,iter_num): 
    return model.Y[i,j,defense,iter_num] + model.Y[j,i,defense,iter_num] <= 
model.u[i,j]*model.W[i,j,defense] 
 
#Choose one defense for each vulnerable edge 
def MasterOneDefense(model,i,j): 
    return sum(model.W[i,j,d] for d in model.Defenses) == 1 
 
#Limit number of defenses 
def MasterDefenseLimit(model): 




    return model.det_wt*model.Z_Det + model.stoch_wt*model.Z_Stoch 
 
#Ensure name of networkx graph is Grph to run effectively 
# need networkx graph named Grph, dictionary for xhats 
def BuildComboMaster(Grph, vulnerable_edges, defenses, max_defenses, 
iterations, det_wt, stoch_wt, xhats, nodepi, edgemu, supply, capacity): 
    #Define model type 
    model = AbstractModel() 
     
    #Put model into Pyomo 
    nodes = Grph.nodes() 
    model.Nodes = Set(initialize=nodes) 
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    model.Vuln = Set(within=model.Nodes*model.Nodes, 
initialize=vulnerable_edges) 
    arcs = Grph.edges() 
    model.Arcs = Set(within=model.Nodes*model.Nodes,initialize=arcs) 
     
    iters = range(iterations) 
    model.Iters = Set(initialize=iters) 
 
    model.Defenses = Set(initialize=defenses) 
 
    model.max_defenses = Param(initialize=max_defenses) 
    #Node dual parameters 
    model.pi = Param(model.Nodes*model.Iters, initialize=nodepi) 
     
    #Arc capacity dual parameters 
    model.mu = Param(model.Arcs*model.Defenses*model.Iters, initialize=edgemu) 
 
    model.xhat = Param(model.Vuln*model.Iters, initialize=xhats) 
 
    #arc costs 
    values= {} 
    for item in Grph.edges(): 
        values[item] = Grph.edge[item[0]][item[1]]['cost'] 
    model.c = Param(model.Nodes,model.Nodes, initialize=values) 
     
    #supplies 
    model.b = Param(model.Nodes,initialize=supply) 
 
    #capacities 
    model.u = Param(model.Vuln, initialize=capacity) 
 
    #Penalty model 
    model.q = Param(model.Arcs, initialize=100) 
     
    #Penalty unsupplied nodes 
    model.v = Param(model.Nodes, initialize=10) 
     
    model.det_wt = Param(initialize=det_wt) 
    model.stoch_wt = Param(initialize=stoch_wt) 
     
    #define objective variables 
    model.Z_Stoch = Var(domain=NonNegativeReals) 
    model.Z_Det = Var(domain=NonNegativeReals) 
 
    #define design variables 
    model.W = Var(model.Vuln*model.Defenses, domain=Binary) 
     
    #define response variables for deterministic cuts 
    model.Y = Var(model.Arcs*model.Defenses*model.Iters, 
domain=NonNegativeReals) 
 
    #Define fuel shortfall at Node 
    model.S = Var(model.Nodes*model.Iters, domain=NonNegativeReals) 
     
     #Master cut constraints    
    model.MasterStochCut = Constraint(model.Iters, rule=MasterStochCut) 
    model.MasterDetCut = Constraint(model.Iters, rule=MasterDetCut) 
     
    #Det flow constraints for each iter 
    model.MasterDetFlowBalance = Constraint(model.Nodes*model.Iters, 
rule=MasterDetFlowBalance) 
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    model.MasterDetEdgeCapacity = 
Constraint(model.Vuln*model.Defenses*model.Iters, rule=MasterDetEdgeCapacity) 
 
    #Master arc defense constraints    
    model.MasterOneDefense = Constraint(model.Vuln, rule=MasterOneDefense) 
     
    #Master limit on number of defenses 
    model.MasterDefenseLimit = Constraint(rule=MasterDefenseLimit) 
 
    #Objective function 
    model.MasterObjective = Objective(rule=MasterObjective, sense=minimize) 
 
    instance=model.create() 
     
    return model, instance 
 
#Create the model instance and Solve returning values for 
#min flow path in variable called shortest 
#need list of double_nodes to create key and edge labels 
 
def SolveModel(instance): 
    opt = SolverFactory("cplex") 
    #opt = SolverFactory("glpk") 
    #ask for duals and reduced costs from solver 
    results = opt.solve(instance, suffixes=['dual','rc']) 
    return results 
 
def BuildResults(instance,results): 
    instance.load(results) 
    #figure arcs defended 
    defended = [] 
    for key in instance.W: 
        if instance.W[key].value > 0: 
            defended.append(key) 
 
    objective_value = instance.MasterObjective() 
    return defended, objective_value 
#End combo_model.py   
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#Begin pyo_model.py 
from __future__ import division 
import sys 
 
#Import coopr and Solver 
from coopr.pyomo import * 
from coopr.opt import SolverFactory 
 
#Network balance of flow constraint 
def FlowBalance(model,node): 
    amountIn = sum (model.Y[i,j,defense] for (i,j,defense) in 
model.Arcs*model.Defenses if j==node) 
    amountOut = sum (model.Y[i,j,defense] for (i,j,defense) in 
model.Arcs*model.Defenses if i==node) 
    supply = model.b[node] 
    return amountOut - amountIn - model.S[node] <= supply  
     
#Define objective equation 
def FlowCost(model): 
    edge_sum = ( 
sum((model.Y[i,j,'0']*(model.c[i,j]+(model.xhat[i,j]*model.q[i,j])))for (i,j) 
in model.Vuln)  
                
+sum((model.Y[j,i,'0']*(model.c[j,i]+(model.xhat[i,j]*model.q[j,i])))for (i,j) 
in model.Vuln)  
                +sum((model.Y[i,j,'1']*(model.c[i,j])) for (i,j) in model.Arcs) 
                 ) 
    node_sum = sum(model.v[j]*model.S[j] for j in model.Nodes) 
    return  edge_sum + node_sum 
 
def EdgeCapacity(model, i, j, defense): 
    return model.Y[i,j,defense] + model.Y[j,i,defense] <= 
model.u[i,j]*model.w_hat[i,j,defense] 
 
#Ensure name of networkx graph is Grph to run effectively 
# need networkx graph named Grph, dictionary for xhats 
def build_model(Grph, xhat, w_hat, vulnerable_edges, defenses, supply, 
capacity): 
    #Define model type 
    model = AbstractModel() 
     
    #Put model into Pyomo 
    nodes = Grph.nodes() 
    model.Nodes = Set(initialize= nodes) 
     
    edges = Grph.edges() 
    model.Arcs = Set(within=model.Nodes*model.Nodes,initialize = edges) 
     
    model.Vuln = Set(within=model.Nodes*model.Nodes,initialize = 
vulnerable_edges) 
 
    model.Defenses = Set(initialize=defenses) 
     
    #create suffixes for dual information 
    model.dual = Suffix(direction=Suffix.IMPORT_EXPORT) 
 
    #Create model for costs 
    values= {} 
    for item in edges: 
        values[item] = Grph.edge[item[0]][item[1]]['cost'] 
    model.c = Param(model.Nodes,model.Nodes, initialize=values) 
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    #Supplies 
    model.b = Param(model.Nodes,initialize=supply) 
         
    #Penalty model 
    model.q = Param(model.Arcs, initialize=100) 
     
    #Penalty unsupplied nodes 
    model.v = Param(model.Nodes, initialize=10) 
     
    #Capacities on vulnerable arcs 
    model.u = Param(model.Vuln, initialize=capacity) 
 
    #Define attack variable 
    model.xhat = Param(model.Vuln,initialize=xhat) 
     
    #Define attack variable 
    model.w_hat = Param(model.Vuln*model.Defenses,initialize=w_hat) 
     
    #Define Variable we want to change 
    model.Y = Var(model.Arcs*model.Defenses, domain=NonNegativeReals) 
     
    #Define fuel shortfall at Node 
    model.S = Var(model.Nodes, domain=NonNegativeReals) 
     
    #Constraint for balance    
    model.FlowBalance = Constraint(model.Nodes, rule=FlowBalance) 
     
    model.EdgeCapacity = Constraint(model.Vuln*model.Defenses, 
rule=EdgeCapacity) 
 
    #Objective function 
    model.FlowCost = Objective(rule=FlowCost, sense=minimize) 
    instance=model.create() 
     
    return model, instance 
 
#Create the model instance and Solve returning values for 
#min flow path in variable called shortest 
#need list of double_nodes to create key and edge labels 
 
def solve_model(instance): 
    opt = SolverFactory("cplex") 
    #opt = SolverFactory("glpk") 
    #ask for duals and reduced costs from solver 
    results = opt.solve(instance, suffixes=['dual','rc']) 
    return results 
 
def build_results(instance,results): 
    instance.load(results) 
    #figure arcs used 
    shortest = [] 
    edge_values = {} 
    for key in instance.Y: 
        if instance.Y[key].value > 0: 
            shortest.append((key[0],key[1])) 
            edge_values[(key[0],key[1])] = instance.Y[key].value 
 
    objective_value = instance.FlowCost(instance) 
    return shortest, edge_values, objective_value 
 #End pyo_model.py 
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